ANS
Investments LLC
▪
50
Battery Place, Suite 7F, New York, NY 10280 ▪
▪
Tel:
(212) 945-2080 ▪ Fax: (508) 629-0074 ▪
▪
Email:
jmeer@verizon.net
September
29, 2008
VIA
ELECTRONIC MAIL, OVERNIGHT MAIL
AND
FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
Magellan
Petroleum Corporation
10
Columbus Blvd.
Hartford,
CT 06106
Attn:
Walter McCann, Chairman
Dear
Mr.
McCann:
As
you
are aware, earlier this month, ANS Investments LLC (“ANS”) delivered a notice to
Magellan Petroleum Corporation (“Magellan”) of our intention to solicit proxies
in support of the election of the undersigned, Jonah M. Meer, the founder and
Chief Executive Officer of ANS, to the Board of Directors of Magellan at the
2008 annual meeting of shareholders. Given the staggered nature of the Magellan
Board, and given its relatively small size, our understanding is that only
one
of your directors is up for re-election this year, Timothy L. Largay, a partner
with your outside counsel Murtha Cullina LLP.
In
contrast to any of the current members of the Magellan Board of Directors,
including yourself or Mr. Largay, or any members of Magellan’s senior management
team, including its Chief Executive Officer Daniel Samela, we have a significant
amount of our capital invested in Magellan. Accordingly, our interests are
aligned with virtually all shareholders.
As
much
as we would have liked to avoid the time and expense of a costly, disruptive
and
distracting proxy contest, the events of the past year have convinced us that
this proxy contest is not only inevitable but absolutely necessary if the
interests of shareholders are to be protected. We are deeply troubled by the
following disappointing events which have occurred in the past 12 months:
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In
February of this year, Magellan settled its tax dispute with the
Australian tax authorities relating to an audit that found that Magellan’s
Australian subsidiaries had claimed substantial tax deductions to
which
they were not entitled. That settlement resulted in a payment to
the
Australian tax authorities of (Aus) $14.6 million (U.S. $13.1 million)
causing the Company to report a loss for the year ended June 30,
2008.
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Magellan
Petroleum Corporation
Attn:
Walter McCann, Chairman
September
29, 2008
Page
2
Rather
than take responsibility and hold someone in management accountable for taking
these now disallowed deductions, in its public communications, Magellan
attributes the tax dispute to aggressive actions taken by the Australian tax
authorities and attempts to “sell the settlement” as necessary to avoid “a
protracted and costly legal battle” with the Australian tax
authorities.
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Just
this month, Magellan publicly announced that shareholders can no
longer
rely on the financial information in the Company’s three most recent
quarterly financial reports filed with the SEC due to certain
miscalculations that caused certain expenses to be understated. Magellan
disclosed its accounting problems in a Form 8-K filing made with
the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 3, 2008. Interestingly,
that same Form 8-K indicated that disclosure of these accounting
issues
and the need for corrections was made to the Australian Securities
and
Investments Commission and the Australian Stock Exchange on Friday,
August
29, 2008. For reasons that are not clear to us, the Company then
waited
until Wednesday, September 3, 2008, to make the required filings
with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on Form 8-K to disclose these
accounting problems.
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According
to Magellan’s Annual Report for its fiscal year ended June 30, 2008, as
filed with the SEC, there has been a significant increase in the
Company’s
operating expenses during the most recently completed fiscal year,
including auditing, accounting and legal expenses which have been
allowed
to increase 75% and other administrative expenses which have increased
33%, in each case when compared to the fiscal year ended June 30,
2007.
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Since
reaching its 52-week high on May 21, 2008 of $2.05, the price of
Magellan’s stock has subsequently tumbled. Based on the closing price of
Magellan’s common stock on September 26, 2008 which was $1.09, Magellan’s
stock price has fallen approximately 47% since reaching its 52-week
high.
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ANS
did
not decide to enter into this proxy contest lightly. Indeed, for the past year,
we have made numerous attempts to engage the Board and senior management of
Magellan in a constructive and meaningful dialogue concerning a host of issues
relating how best to collaborate and work together to enhance and grow
shareholder value, including our thoughts and suggestions on changes in
strategy, operations, focus and use of capital that we believe, if implemented,
would have the potential to improve shareholder returns. We believe that there
are clearly a number of untapped opportunities to improve value at Magellan
through, among other things, sharper strategic focus, better operational
execution and more efficient uses of capital. Through constructive engagement,
we had hoped to be a productive catalyst for improving shareholder value.
Magellan
Petroleum Corporation
Attn:
Walter McCann, Chairman
September
29, 2008
Page
3
Unfortunately,
the Magellan Board has repeatedly spurned our overtures, and we have found
the
Magellan Board to be unapproachable, unwilling to listen to our ideas and
suggestions and unresponsive to our concerns with respect to, among other
things, the Australian tax debacle, operating performance, corporate governance
and other issues affecting, or which could have the potential to affect,
shareholder value. As recently as this past July, we received a letter from
one
of Mr. Largay’s partners at Murtha Cullina, Edward B. Whittemore, who also
serves as your Corporate Secretary, requesting that we immediately cease all
further direct communications with you, other members of the Magellan Board
and
your Chief Executive Officer, Daniel Samela, and to funnel all of our future
correspondence through Mr. Whittemore. Mr. Whittemore indicated that he was
making such request at Magellan’s direction. We have never encountered a more
blatant attempt to shut off communications with a significant shareholder than
this and I cannot imagine a more crystal clear example of a company wanting
to
“bury its head in the sand” and avoid constructively engaging with its
shareholders.
We
believe that Mr. Whittemore’s letter to us was a result of the shareholder
demand under Delaware law that we made this past March seeking documents and
other information relating to Magellan’s Australian tax debacle. After months of
unreturned telephone calls and unanswered written inquiries, we were forced
to
make our shareholder demand to compel Magellan to release information that
it
had not previously included in its publicly filed materials. When this
information was finally provided by Magellan in response to our demand letter,
we were stunned to learn that Magellan could not explain various aspects of
the
deductions that it had taken (which were subsequently disallowed). Months later,
we have still not been supplied with all the information that we requested.
We
expect nothing less than complete transparency and believe that all shareholders
are entitled to full, frank and complete disclosure about the events that led
up
to the decision by the Magellan Board to pay the Australian tax authorities
(AUS) $14.6 million (U.S. $13.1 million) or approximately 29% of Magellan’s
market capitalization based on the closing price of Magellan’s common stock on
September 26, 2008. We call upon the Magellan Board to take steps to immediately
and publicly release all documents and information relating to the Company’s
Australian tax debacle.
It
is
time for the Board to publicly address and respond in detail to the many issues
that we have raised which we believe are of deep concern to our fellow
shareholders. Accordingly, we request that Magellan promptly and publicly
provide answers to the following:
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The
Magellan Board been unable to explain the basis upon which Magellan
claimed (AUS) $40 million in tax deductions which ultimately required
Magellan to pay (AUS) $14.6 million (U.S. $13.1 million) when these
deductions were ultimately rejected by the Australian tax authorities.
Your CEO has indicated that he was unfamiliar with the details of
the tax
settlement calculations. Why is Magellan’s Board and CEO unable to explain
the use of the AUS $40 million in tax deductions as they are critical
to
any evaluation of the amounts paid to settle the tax
dispute?
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Magellan
Petroleum Corporation
Attn:
Walter McCann, Chairman
September
29, 2008
Page
4
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The
Company was advised in its settlement of the Australian tax dispute
by the
same accounting firm which advised Magellan in connection with Magellan’s
decision to claim the tax deductions that were ultimately rejected
by the
Australian tax authorities. How could the Magellan Board have approved
a
tax settlement requiring payment of approximately 29% of the Company’s
market capitalization in reliance on advice from the same accounting
and
tax advisors that had advised the Company on the now-disallowed tax
deductions?
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As
noted above, earlier this month, Magellan was forced to publicly
disclose
that shareholders can no longer rely on the financial information
in the
Company’s three most recent quarterly financial reports filed with the SEC
due to certain miscalculations that caused certain expenses to be
understated. Why did this occur, who was responsible, what actions
have
been taken to hold the person(s) responsible and what steps have
been
taken to ensure that this never happens again and that shareholders
can
confidently rely on the Company’s future financial
statements?
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What
is Magellan’s strategic plan and what actions have been taken by the Board
to address the declining stock price and increase shareholder
value?
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What
steps is the Magellan Board taking to improve its oversight of management
and the governance of the Company?
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These
questions are fundamental and must be addressed fully, frankly and publicly
by
the Magellan Board at the earliest possible time.
You
and I
have previously discussed my concerns with respect to the lack of any
significant stock ownership by the Magellan directors, including yourself,
or
the members of the Magellan management team. In your letter to me, dated January
28, 2008, you asserted that “. . . it is generally recognized that the size of a
director’s shareholdings is not the only relevant criterion for membership on
the board of directors of a public company.” While we agree that stock ownership
is not the only
relevant
criterion (we
also believe that requiring each director to satisfy strict standards of
independence is also essential),
we
believe that it is essential that the interests of board members be aligned
with
those of virtually all shareholders. Accordingly, we believe that Magellan
should adopt stock ownership guidelines for all directors and executive officers
as many other public companies have done so. In your January 2008 letter, you
also indicated that the Magellan Board was going to address the issue of stock
ownership in the “near future.” Nine months have come and gone and we have yet
to hear of any initiatives taken by Magellan to require all directors and
executive officers to have some “skin in the game” and become significant
shareholders in the Company. This is unfathomable to us given that the current
stock price has fallen from its 52-week high to just over a $1 per
share.
Magellan
Petroleum Corporation
Attn:
Walter McCann, Chairman
September
29, 2008
Page
5
Due
to
the lack of any significant ownership by the current members of the Magellan
Board, we do not believe that the interests of the Magellan shareholders are
fully represented on the Magellan Board. In your January 2008 letter to me,
in
response to my expressed interest in representing the shareholders on the
Magellan Board, rather than take the opportunity to learn more about my
background, experience and qualifications and how I could meaningfully
contribute and add value as a member of the Magellan Board, you ended your
letter to me by simply referring me to the section of the Company’s annual
meeting proxy statement that addresses shareholder nominations “at page 6.”
That, again, was an indication to us that we had few alternatives to the
commencement of a costly and distracting proxy contest to ensure that
shareholders are adequately represented on the Magellan Board.
We
also
believe that the Magellan Board should take steps to enhance its independence.
The primary purpose of the Board of Directors is to protect the shareholders'
interests by providing independent oversight of management. We believe that,
given the Australian tax debacle and the recent announcement by the Company
that
shareholders cannot rely on its three most recently released quarterly financial
statements, the Company can surely benefit from increased independent oversight
of management. In addition, we believe that by enhancing the independence of
the
Magellan Board, investors’ confidence in Magellan will be enhanced and investors
will be able to more confidently rely on the decisions made by its Board of
Directors, particularly on such important matters as its decision to pay (Aus)
$14.6 million (U.S. $13.1 million) to the Australian tax authorities, management
accountability and related party transactions. Rather than adopt a heightened
definition of independent director such as the definitions advocated by
RiskMetrics ISS, much to our disappointment, Magellan has adopted the more
liberal definition established by Nasdaq. We do not believe that, under the
definition of independent director advocated by leading corporate governance
advocates such as RiskMetrics ISS, Mr. Largay, as a partner with your outside
law firm, can reasonably be construed to be a truly independent director,
particularly given the significant six figure fees that his law firm has been
paid by Magellan in the past year. As you may be aware, the RiskMetrics ISS
definition of a truly independent director, or “independent outside director,”
is someone with no material connection to the company other than a board seat.
RiskMetrics ISS further notes, for clarity, that a person who currently provides
professional services to the company in excess of $10,000 a year is not an
“independent outside director.” The Magellan Petroleum Annual Report on Form
10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2008, as filed with the SEC, discloses
in a “related party transactions” footnote that Mr. Largay’s law firm was paid
fees of $264,170, $114,415 and $170,481 by the Company in fiscal years 2008,
2007 and 2006, respectively. Accordingly, under the RiskMetrics ISS definition,
Mr. Largay would clearly not qualify as an “independent outside director.”
Magellan
Petroleum Corporation
Attn:
Walter McCann, Chairman
September
29, 2008
Page
6
We
are
fully aware of how costly, disruptive and distracting a proxy contest will
be
for both of us, but we believe that you have left us with no viable alternative
in order to ensure that the interests of shareholders are protected. While
we
remain deeply frustrated and greatly disappointed with your steadfast refusal
to
constructively engage with us and engage in a meaningful dialogue, we still
remain open to working constructively with Magellan’s board and management to
improve operating performance, enhance oversight of management, reform corporate
governance, and enhance shareholder value. Unfortunately, your lack of interest
in constructively engaging with us has left us with no alternative but to
preserve our right to bring our concerns directly to the attention of our fellow
Magellan shareholders which we did earlier this month through our delivery
to
Magellan of our advance notice of nomination and shareholder
proposals.
If
you
believe that it would be productive for us to constructively discuss this matter
and possibly pursue an amicable resolution before this proxy contest reaches
a
“point of no return” for both of us, please do not hesitate to contact me.
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Sincerely,
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ANS
Investments LLC
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/s/
Jonah M. Meer
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Jonah
M. Meer,
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Chief
Executive Officer
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cc:
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Patrick
B. Salisbury, Esq.
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Keith
E. Gottfried, Esq.
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Edward
B. Whittemore, Esq.
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Raymond
J. DiCamillo, Esq.
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